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1.  Introduction
As the Church of England’s chief ecumenical officer I spend much of my
time working for greater understanding between the Church of England and
other churches. This includes interpreting the Anglican tradition, especially its
ecclesiology, to ecumenical partner churches. It involves receiving in turn their
interpretation of their own traditions. We bring our perceptions of their church-
es and they bring their perceptions of ours. This kind of interface between the
churches is not without its surprises: we discover that others do not necessarily
believe what we thought they believed and do not necessarily disbelieve what
we assumed they disbelieved. And they make similar discoveries about us.
Above all, as we dig deep into what makes us what we are as churches, we
always strike the same bedrock, the bedrock of love for Christ and his cross,
and faith in his resurrection and its sustaining power. That is the deepest root
of our unity.
In the course of my work I have met many interesting people and made
many excellent friends across the world. There is no substitute for meeting
each other and talking at length. Ecumenism takes place at the inter-personal
level; it is a relational activity. We study together, pray together, wrestle with
problems together, eat and relax together. Cor ad cor loquitur – heart speaking
to heart, Newman’s motto. Like all forms of relationship ecumenism shapes us
and changes us. Relationships make us what we are; they constitute us as per-
sons. We are not first of all fully formed individuals, finished products, who
then present ourselves to others for a relationship. We are created as persons by
our relationships with all around us, especially «significant others» such as par-
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ents, siblings, teachers, spouses, close colleagues.1 So it is in the great enter-
prise of Christian unity. The experience of ecumenism enriches us, transforms
us, and in the end makes us different people.
When enough people in the churches have been touched by the lived expe-
rience of unity and changed by it, the churches also will begin to change. But
that critical mass in the churches needs to be achieved first. The churches as
institutions are like huge ocean-going vessels, oil tankers or aircraft carriers:
they cannot change tack quickly. Any change of direction needs to grip the
whole vessel, from stem to stern; it needs to be understood on the ship’s
bridge. The transforming experience of Christian unity has to pervade
a church before it can influence policy and inspire reform. And reform is what
it takes: a deep, penitent refreshment and reorientation of our perceptions of
the other and a revision of the judgements of them that have directed our
stance until now.2
Deeper mutual understanding is what our work is about, because that
understanding is the pre-condition for realising our unity in Christ and
expressing it in visible ways. Whatever goodwill individual gestures may gen-
erate, only the churches themselves, as institutions, can take steps to unity and
they cannot do this unless sufficient mutual understanding has been achieved
at an official level. So the test of all our efforts is whether the prerequisite of
deeper mutual understanding is being achieved. Now, to seek understanding,
whether of texts or of cultures, or even of peoples and their communities,
such as churches, is to engage in hermeneutics, in the art of interpretation.
Gadamer writes: 
The way that we experience one another, the way that we experience historical
traditions, the way that we experience the natural givenness of our existence and of
our world constitutes a truly hermeneutic universe».3 
Looked at in this light, ecumenism is essentially a hermeneutical enter-
prise. To make progress in Christian unity, we need skills in the art of inter-
pretation.
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2.  The ecumenical task
I understand the ecumenical movement of the past century as, in the first
instance, a quest for mutual understanding between churches. The churches
find themselves separated, for various reasons —some good, some not so
good— from one another, but all the time they know that in Christ they belong
together. The churches hold the unforgettable knowledge that the Church is
one in Christ. This knowledge is inscribed in their DNA. In the Nicene-Con-
stantinopolitan Creed we confess that the Church is one. The biblical charter
of Christian unity is found in Ef 4,4-5: «There is one body and one Spirit, just
as you were called to the one hope of your calling, one Lord, one faith, one
baptism, one God and Father of all». The unity that is referred to in Ephesians
is clearly not a structural, political or institutional unity (though those aspects
are eventually inescapable for us today), but it is a unity in the Spirit, who
calls God’s people together, and in the common, basic confession that is
expressed in baptism. «In the one Spirit we were all baptised into one body»
(1Co 12,13).
So in one sense, according to the divine constitution of the one Church of
Jesus Christ, division is a christological and pneumatological impossibility.
And yet it exists. We encounter bitter division and cruel exclusion all the time.
Division is just as much a mark of the Church as unity is. We are dealing here
with an intolerable anomaly, the ultimate aporia. The Church is one, but is
obviously divided; it is united, yet remains fragmented. It is simultaneously
united and divided. «How can these things be?». Precisely in that unbearable
tension lies the ecumenical imperative. The title of a recent book of essays
sums it up: The Unity We Have and the Unity We Seek.4 Unity is already given
in Christ and the Spirit, but the imperative, the vocation laid upon the Church
is to grasp and that unity and to express it. It is both gift and task.
Ecumenical activity, as the drive to realise the unity that is a given reality, is
therefore a prolonged and far-reaching search for understanding of one another.
But to understand one another as churches must mean to understanding the
Church of Jesus Christ as it is discovered in one another. As those texts from
Ephesians and 1 Corinthians remind us, we come to know the Church only in
the Spirit and through the Spirit. The Spirit who resides in us, in our expression
of the Church, reaches out to embrace the same Spirit who resides in our fel-
low Christians and in the expression of the Church to which they belong. Just
as Christ cannot be divided, his Spirit cannot be divided (1Co 1,13). The Christ
in us longs to be united with the Christ in them. Heart speaks to heart and Spir-
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it cries out to Spirit. St Paul is saying something like like this when he writes:
«The Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God. For what human
being knows what is truly human except the human spirit that is within? So
also no one comprehends what is truly God’s except the Spirit of God» (1Co 2,
10-11).
The nature of the Church and the nature of its unity cannot be known in the
abstract, a priori, but only through encounter with Christ in Christians and
churches. It will not do to start with a paper blueprint of the Church and then
measure churches against it (which is something, I confess, that we are all, as
ecumenical theologians, prone to do, and that all churches are prone to do).
The Church is known in ecclesial praxis —practical experience of being the
Church, shaped by theology, but not dictated by it. We come to know what the
Church is through our experience of koinonia, that key New Testament Greek
term that refers to a mutual participation or sharing in a reality that is greater
than any partial appropriation of it. As the first letter of John puts it: «We
declare to you what we have seen and heard so that you also may have koinon-
ia with us; and truly our koinonia is with the Father and with his Son Jesus
Christ» (1Jn 1,3). The ecumenical quest is a profoundly spiritual calling, a pil-
grimage of faith. All true ecumenism is «spiritual ecumenism». By the same
token, when ecumenical activity lacks zest, and has become dreary and unin-
spiring, that is because it has lost its way and drifted from its original calling,
which is to seek Christ and the Spirit of Christ in all the manifestations of the
Body of Christ, seeking to discern the Body (cf. 1Co 11,29).
Because ecumenism is devoted to understanding through a process of ever
deeper exploration, it takes the form of a narrative quest —a search for the
identity of the Church. But because the Church is Christ’s body, it is a search
that is inseparable from the search for the identity of Jesus Christ, which must
be the ultimate goal of all Christian theology.5 Identity is not so much
a «given» as a quest. The evolution of a coherent human identity over a life-
time can be seen as a narrative quest, a search for the unity of a character
within a story.6 The same applies to communities and to the traditions and his-
tories that shape them: they are constantly evolving in ways that serve the
long-term survival and success of the society. Similarly, the ecumenical
process is a journey on which we are engaged in a search for ecclesial identity
—the identity of the one Church of Christ, the identity of our partner church-
es, and the identity of our own church. These identities are not given apriori,
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not presupposed, not fixed non-negotiable positions, but are unfolded, discov-
ered, disclosed. 
The revelation of the nature of the Church can only be the work of the Holy
Spirit, bearing witness to Christ in his Body. The longing for unity is undoubt-
edly inspired by the Holy Spirit and will be achieved by the Spirit, provided
we allow ourselves to be led by the Spirit, as the Apostle Paul urges (Rm 8,14;
Ga 5,18). In Paul, as we have noted, the Spirit searches the deep things of God
and makes them known to the Church. In St John’s Gospel, the Paraclete is the
interpreter who makes known the things of Christ to the disciples (Jn 16,13-
14). It makes sense to see the Spirit as the interpreter because the Spirit creates
communion (koinonia, communio) and communion cannot come about until
there is mutual understanding, rapport and trust. The Church, in which misun-
derstandings, distorted perceptions and competitive power struggles are
endemic, is called to be a community of authentic interpretation, a community
of understanding, a community of personal knowledge.7
We can get to know someone only by inhabiting the same personal space as
they do, interacting with them, living, working, thinking, eating and relaxing
with them. After a while we begin to think that we understand them a bit. As
we live together in a family, a marriage or a small community we gradually
come to understand one another quite well, though there is always the possibil-
ity of a surprise. Then we say that a person has «acted out of character», but
what we really should say is that we did not know them as well as we thought
we did. So too the ecumenical process of understanding involves interacting
together in many ways and at various levels: not least by praying together,
reflecting and studying together, and by co-operating and collaborating in
forms of witness and mission to the wider world. I am convinced that the clear-
est, most authentic mutual understanding between still separated churches
comes about when they work in harness as mission partners, that is to say in
evangelisation. Because then they are fulfilling together the primary task of the
Church, which is make disciples of all nations, to proclaim the gospel to the
whole creation (Mt 28,16-20; Mc 16,15 [longer ending]). In this activity of
mission they are closest to what it means to be the Church and this creates the
conditions for knowing one another in truth.8
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The ecumenical experience has been described in terms of mutual «recep-
tion».9 The notion of reception has been applied theologically in several
ways: the reception of texts —say biblical or conciliar texts— by a communi-
ty; the reception of certain new developments in the life of the Church; the
reception of the contributions of particular theologians; and the mutual recep-
tion of churches as they recognise, accept and begin to trust each other, so
making possible an exchange of the gifts that they have to offer, for the sake
of mutual enrichment and mutual correction. The New Testament, particular-
ly the Pauline literature, is rich in «reception» language, deriving from the
Greek lambano and its cognates. Particularly apposite here is Rm 15,7:
«Receive [as the AV/KJV translates proslambanesthe; accept or welcome; lit-
erally, take to yourselves, to your homes] one another, as God in Christ has
received you, for the glory of God». Ecumenical reception means churches
taking one another to themselves; taking their faithful, their traditions and
their spirituality to themselves. Ecumenical reception means the symbiosis of
churches, the interpenetration of traditions. Reception is a spiritual process
and requires that we open ourselves to the other, giving theological hospitali-
ty, thinking more of what we can learn than of what we can teach, more of
what we can receive than what we can give. What has recently been called
«receptive ecumenism» is the only sort of ecumenism worthy of the name
and gets to the heart of what is going on when we interact ecumenically, but
non-polemically.10
One prominent feature of the ecumenical movement is the theological dia-
logue, which is often set up on an international basis. The Anglican —Roman
Catholic International Commission (ARCIC) is the one best known to Angli-
cans, but it is one of many. The Methodist— Roman Catholic International
Commission is an estimable example. International dialogues, such as these,
attract considerable interest within the churches and their reports can arouse
strong reactions. These dialogues do not drive the ecumenical movement but are
a particular expression of its overall quest for mutual understanding. Dialogues
between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion, the World
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Methodist Council, the Lutheran World Federation, etc., are especially centres
of ecumenical expectation, conductors of mutual suspicion or mutual reconcilia-
tion. The dialogues are an absolutely essential part of ecumenism because their
task is to attempt theological convergence. Theological convergence, especially
on the nature of the Church, is the sine qua non of ecumenism. Without theo-
logical convergence between the churches, ecumenical activity can degenerate
into mere sentiment or pragmatism. Convergence provides a basis for working
together and worshipping together with integrity. Every initiative in shared life
and mission should be based on the degree of convergence that has been
achieved. And every step of convergence should be matched by steps in shared
life and mission. Convergence makes formal mutual recognition between the
churches possible and that demands mutual commitment (recognition and com-
mitment are the standard pattern of ecumenical agreements). 
It is sad and frustrating when genuine convergence is offered to the church-
es and seems to disappear into a Black Hole: it makes no difference in practice,
or is even regarded with suspicion. It sometimes feels as though this is the case
with ARCIC’s agreement on «Ministry and Ordination» and «Eucharistic Doc-
trine» in the early 1970s and with the various Anglican-Orthodox reports that
have achieved broad convergence on ecclesiology.11 The extent of such conver-
gence is very encouraging, but not particularly surprising for those who have
a decent knowledge of the traditions concerned. But there are many who do not
want to accept the reality of deep convergence between the major Christian tra-
ditions. They prefer to maintain their entrenched positions and to define the
other in their own terms, which are usually a caricature.
The dialogical method is not restricted to the prestigious international dia-
logues, but pervades the whole ecumenical enterprise in all its activities.12
Understanding comes through dialogue, as we question our partner and allow
ourselves to be questioned. As we lay out the results of our conversation, we
seek to discern threads of argument that link together, ways of saying the same
thing in different words and of affirming the same underlying reality concealed
beneath different philosophical models. These are the building blocks that con-
tribute towards a common mind. Dialogue is not served by one party making
lofty pronouncements that are meant to be beyond challenge or by pronounc-
ing judgement on the other partner. Dialogue is served by patient, courteous
explanation, by interpreting ourselves to one another, identifying inappropriate
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presuppositions, correcting misunderstandings, dealing with stereotypes, and
struggling to find forms of words that both can own as they recognise their
own faith as it is articulated in fresh ways.13
As we feel our way towards a truth that is greater than either of us, light
dawns in several areas. We learn how we appear to others —often a salutary
experience. We recognise the part that fear and resentment, jealousy and desire
play in distorting our perceptions. As we are subjected to questioning about the
tradition we represent, we may wonder whether we ourselves know it well
enough, that is as much as to say, in those circumstances, whether we know
ourselves. And we come up against the fundamental hermeneutical challenge:
can we know what it is like to be the other? If we cannot know what it is like
to be the other, to stand in their shoes and to feel something of what they feel,
even to some extent, understanding will elude us. But this enlightenment can-
not be attained in any casual way; it will not drop into our hands. It has to be
worked for by hard study combined with demanding spiritual discipline. We
are talking about a process of education of the heart as well as of the head, an
enlargement of the imagination, a purification of the intention and all in all a
conversion to the Christ who indwells the other in a way that is not exactly
identical with the way that he indwells us.14
In his recent work Communion and Otherness, John Zizioulas has placed
otherness at the heart of Christian existence and at the centre of ecclesiology.
The relational ontology that he set out in Being in Communion is now devel-
oped to accentuate the tension between the two poles of integration and other-
ness. For Zizioulas human beings are «defined» through the reality of other-
ness: it is what makes each person unique. We are created and destined for
communion, but not without the frisson of otherness. Human beings uniquely
have the capacity to combine communion and otherness: «only a person can
express communion and otherness simultaneously». In the Church, commu-
nion (koinonia) does not stifle or threaten otherness, but generates it and allows
it to flourish. True unity gives a place to otherness because it needs it. «Other-
ness is constitutive of unity». The Church can be described equally as commu-
nion in otherness or otherness in communion.15 It is the reality of otherness
within communion that sets ecumenical hermeneutics its challenge.
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Although the structural, institutional results of ecumenical dialogue are fair-
ly meagre (though certainly not negligible), theological convergence has been
substantial and has begun to change the way that the churches view one anoth-
er and behave towards one another. The huge collections of documents in two
volumes under the title Growth in Agreement testify to the extent of conver-
gence.16 In some areas of dialogue, the participants have learned the valuable
lesson that if they have not achieved 100% agreement (has this ever hap-
pened?), what they should then do is not to find a form a words that glosses
over and conceals real unresolved differences (what we call in English
a «fudge»), but rather that they should set out a «differentiated consensus».17
A differentiated consensus is an agreement that is incomplete, a statement of
convergence that has limitations. You say what you can say together, and you
say what you need to say separately. You flag up issues for further work. Dif-
ferentiated consensus represents the convergence of two lines of tradition that
have approached each other but have not yet met and joined. The outstanding
example of an agreement for differentiated consensus is the Joint Declaration
on the Doctrine of Justification, signed by the Roman Catholic Church and the
Lutheran World Federation on Reformation Day, 31 October 1999.
3.  The hermeneutical task of ecumenism
I have been arguing that the search for Christian unity is essentially
a hermeneutical matter, concerned with achieving mutual understanding
between communities and traditions. Though there is a «family resemblance»
between these communities and traditions, there is also difference and the
experience of otherness.18 Forms of Christianity that are not our own are suffi-
ciently similar to allow us to indwell them to some extent: we can identify with
them, own them and feel, up to a point, that this church is our concern, not
merely someone else’s. The tension between sameness and difference makes it
possible for us to «have a stake» in them, while not belonging to them. At the
end of the conference on Receptive Ecumenism (see n. 9), I was able to say
that for the first time I felt that the Roman Catholic Church was «my church» –
even though I know that that church does not accept my Anglican Orders and
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does not normally allow me to receive Holy Communion at the Eucharists that
it celebrates. There is plenty of difference and otherness, but that does not
entirely blot out the sense that there is a belonging too.
4.  Texts and trust
On the narrowest definition, hermeneutics concerns the interpretation of
texts. It asks, What is a text saying? What does it mean? But in that little word
«mean» there lies much perplexity. There is a small philosophical industry
devoted to the meaning of meaning! We immediately get into a multiplicity of
questions about who is speaking to whom in the text. Is the meaning that of the
original author, and what if there is not a single author but a committee or
a council, or if the text has been edited by someone else, or passed through
centuries of redaction, like some of the Old Testament literature? Or do we
intend the meaning as experienced by the reader today in his or her particular
context, and if so, does that imply that the meaning is infinitely flexible? With-
out plunging into those contested issues, we can say at the least, that there is an
inescapable semantic element to hermeneutics. We know that we need to look
closely at words and combinations of words in propositions of various kinds.
We need to identify the genre of the statement in question, before making up
our minds what it is saying. We need to be alert to the context in which the
words are spoken. We need to hold back on judgement and critique, to bracket
out the question of the truth or validity of the statement, until we are reason-
ably confident that we have understood what it «intends» to say. But even then
our work is hardly begun.19
Careful semantic enquiry was vital to the achievement of convergence on
the doctrine of justification between Roman Catholic and reformed traditions,
which had condemned each other on this point at the time of the Reformation.
The various dialogues that tackled this problem needed to tease out the various
scholastic senses in which the Council of Trent spoke of the «cause» of justifi-
cation. They needed to bring out clearly the fact that when Roman Catholics
used the word «justification», they included sanctification, whereas reformed
writers used the term «sanctification» to refer to a conceptually distinct process
of personal growth in holiness following the act of justification. They needed
to see that when Reformation theologians spoke of «justification by faith» they
did not understand faith as simply intellectual assent or as a human work, but
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as a personal act of trust, a receptive appropriation of an act of God’s grace.20
The dialogues set aside polemic in order to clarify misunderstandings and
overcome stereotypes. There was a will to succeed, to understand, and to reach
agreement, though not at the expense of «fudging» the problems. Karl
Lehmann has described hermeneutics as the attempt to reach intersubjective
agreement.21 Hermeneutics is indeed about the meeting of minds across a dis-
tance, and in that quest the study of words and statements has a vital place.
In discourse about the Church certain «big» and luminous words are
unavoidable: Church, unity, body, catholic, mission, sacrament, Eucharist,
Bible, even bishop and certainly pope. Such words are used in more than their
«plain sense». They are often deployed rhetorically to give signals, to mark
a position, to point to an as yet not fully specified future. They are words that
are invoked or declaimed, spoken in a different register to other more manage-
able words. I think that «unity» is the most powerful of these. Unity is a lumi-
nous and indeed numinous word, a spell-binding word. It attracts and draws us,
though some people seem to shrink from it. A thesis that I examined several
years ago analysed the use of the word «unity» in a range of ecumenical state-
ments. The author could find no common or coherent meaning attached to that
word. The conclusion that ecumenists did not know what they were talking
about when they used the word «unity» was difficult to resist.22 This sort of
exercise raises the question whether ecumenists are saying the same thing
when they use the same words. We need to be constantly alert to that question.
Some years ago the ecumenical instrument Churches Together in England con-
ducted an enquiry among its member churches on ecclesiology and unity, using
a questionnaire. The first questions were: «What do you mean by Church?»
and «How do you use the word?». Not surprisingly, the answers were multi-
layered and nuanced, but they were not incoherent.
An alternative to the approach that says, «When we use the same word, do
we mean the same thing?», is to ask, «Can using the same words help us to
think the same thoughts?». Words like «Church», «unity», «body» have enor-
mous resonances and carry an army of meanings in their wake. They are over-
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determined; they have an aura and a numinous power. Is this simply because of
all the layers of history that they incorporate (as Polanyi suggested)? Or do
they tap into something in the collective unconscious, in the Jungian sense;
have they become symbols of what they stand for, participating in the reality
that they represent? Either way, they are inevitable and unsubstitutable; no
other words will quite do. Their depth cannot be understood purely analytical-
ly. They evoke a response from the whole person, one of empathy or of antipa-
thy (in the case of bishop, pope or mass, they can be «neuralgic» words).
To understand how such words perform in a text we need to adopt what
Polanyi called the «fiduciary» approach to language and to truth. We need
to take language on trust and let it work within us, as well as for us. We have to
trust it before we can test it. We have to indwell it before we can marshall it.
As S. T. Coleridge put it, «words are not things, but living powers, by which
the things that are of greatest importance to mankind are actuated, combined
and humanized».23 They have creative potential to call into existence the reali-
ty to which they point.24 They are words to meditate on, not to bandy about.
The task of distinguishing meanings is still necessary, but it needs to be carried
out in a humble awareness that the material we are handling has explosive
power.
5.  Distance and empathy
If the narrowest definition of hermeneutics is the interpretation of texts,
a wider application, developed by F. D. E. Schleiermacher, concerns the inter-
pretation of all form of expression: written, oral and symbolic.25 While particu-
lar techniques are still required (as in the interpretation of texts), it may be true
to say that intuitive perception plays a larger role, because the data is more
diverse and more dispersed and there are no technical methodological princi-
ACTES DEL CONGRÉS «PARAULA DE DÉU, PARAULA SOBRE DÉU»148
23. S. T. Coleridge, «Aids to Reflection», in J. Beer (ed.), Collected Works, vol. 9, Lon-
don: Routledge and Kegan Paul; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1993, p. 10 (capitali-
sation altered).
24. See P. Avis, God and the Creative Imagination: Metaphor, Symbol and Myth in Reli-
gion and Theology, London –New York: Routledge 1999.
25. For Schleiermacher, followed in this respect by Dilthey, to understand a text, we have to
move beyond the actual words and to seek to understand the subjectivity of the author; thus
grammatical interpretation needs to be supplemented by psychological interpretation. The aim
amounts to the re-creation of the original creative act and thus even to understand an author bet-
ter than he understood himself: Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 164. F. D. E. Schleierma-
cher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, H. Kimmerle (ed.), J. Duke – J.
Forstman (trans.), Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press 1977; Ibid., Hermeneutics and Criticism and
Other Writings, A. Bowie (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998.
ples that enable us to grasp them as a whole. Gadamer has called these intu-
itive skills «tact» —a particular sensitivity are awareness to diverse situations
and a sense of how to negotiate them.26 Wilhelm Dilthey took Schleiermach-
er’s approach further, applying hermeneutics to the interpretation of whole
«life-», large communities that are sustained by their traditions, including dis-
tinctive beliefs, symbols of identity, recognised moral values and mores, and
structures of authority that preserve that identity by policing boundaries.27
These life-worlds may be in the past, requiring an historical (diachronic)
hermeneutic, or they may be in the present, requiring a contemporary (syn-
chronic) hermeneutic.
In either case we come up against the problem of conceptual distance,
either historical or cultural. Interpretation in the face of distance, in either con-
text, is immensely difficult: a sense of resistance due to strangeness, of alien-
ation, has to be overcome. The feeling of otherness is palpable – though this
strangeness, alienation and otherness are not complete, but only partial. We
could not get started unless we had some ground in common. We find that
common factor in the questing mind. It is the human mind and imagination that
has shaped both them and us, so there is an essential affinity. In the mid-eigh-
teenth century G. B. Vico wrote in his New Science:
In the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from
ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of a truth beyond all ques-
tion: that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men and that its prin-
ciples are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind.28
The hermeneutic of remote life-worlds is not only supremely difficult, it is
also painful. It hurts to peer into what Shakespeare calls «the dark backward
and abysm of time»29 and it hurts to try to align ourselves with a community
and culture that is different to our own. Vico spoke of the agonising effort of
empathy that was required, combined with strenuous research. Dilthey said
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that history was «a great dark book, the collected work of the human spirit,
written in the languages of the past, the text of which we have to try to under-
stand».30
The hermeneutics of unity are no less challenging. The imperative of Chris-
tian unity is not selective, but all embracing, requiring an attitude of «all round
and every level ecumenism», whereby we take whatever steps we can to make
more visible the inalienable unity of Christ’s body in the world. We may feel
an «elective affinity»31 with certain Christian traditions, and be repelled by oth-
ers. But, to adapt a famous classical saying: I am a Christian and nothing
Christian is alien to me.32 Just as, when we look at the lives of the saints, we
try to see Christ in them, so with Christians of traditions that leave us cold,
something of Christ in them answers to something of Christ in us. As it evokes
empathy, it bridges the distance. 
6.  Projection and enlightenment
The ecumenical enterprise is about working for deeper mutual understand-
ing between separated Christian churches and the traditions that make them
what they are. We seek to achieve this understanding through sharing in fel-
lowship, prayer and ministry, and above all as we join together in mission and
evangelisation initiatives. On a different plane, ecumenical theological dia-
logue works to remove misconceptions, demolish stereotypes, set out common
ground and clarify remaining differences: in other words, dialogue creates
understanding. For Schleiermacher, hermeneutics was «the art of avoiding mis-
understandings».33 The more we do understand each other, the more we will be
able to accept each other. Understanding and acceptance are the preconditions
for institutional changes that will enable us to express our indestructible unity
in Christ in visible ways before the world. 
In general epistemology, understanding comes when our powers of percep-
tion go out into the object, the other, and seek to indwell it. When we indwell
a piece of literature, a work of art, a landscape or even the persona of another
human being we internalise that object and it becomes part of our own subjec-
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tivity. This is how we come to know, to understand and to make sense of reali-
ty. But when the spirit of a person is drawn out without their being aware of it,
unintentionally and unconsciously, and is installed itself, so to speak, in anoth-
er, we use the psychological term projection. Projection has been defined as
«the process by which specific impulses, wishes, aspects of the self, or internal
objects are imagined to be located in some object external to oneself».34 Here
perception has become projection. Projection has a distorting effect, reshaping
what it perceives in the act of appropriating it and fashioning it in its own
unacknowledged image. As Jung put it: «Projections change the world into the
replica of one’s unknown face.»35
A distorting process of projection can take place on a collective scale, as
well as at the level of individuals —community to community, nation to
nation, and church to church. Collectivities can define themselves over against
other collectivities. You name your enemy in order to know who you are. Anti-
semitism and general racism are particularly ugly and indeed lethal forms of
collective projection. The two great collectivities that were antagonists in the
mid-twentieth century were Fascism and Communism, both authoritarian,
totalitarian ideologies. Horkheimer and Adorno developed the Freudian con-
cept of «morbid projection» as a critical tool against authoritarianism and total-
itarianism. Morbid projection consists of the transference of socially taboo
impulses from the social subject to the social object. In violently reacting
against those impulses seen in the other, the individual is rejecting a disowned
part of himself or herself. A combination of psychological analysis and ideo-
logical critique is needed to unmask it.36
In a sense that appears rather trivial compared to the gigantic ideological
conflicts of the last century, churches that live in the same space and compete
for hegemony also define themselves over against one another (e.g. Roman
Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland until very recently). But it
applies across the board, not merely in extreme situations, that you know who
you are when you know that you are not the other. Roman Catholics know that
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they are not Protestants and vice-versa. Anglicans know that they are not
Methodists and vice-versa. Orthodox know that they are not any of these.
Whenever we perpetuate the stereotyping and stigmatising that has has proved
so destructive in Christian history we entrench separation and division. No
authentic hermeneutic is at work here. I speak with feeling because I often do
not recognise my church in the way that the Roman Catholic Church describes
it and passes judgement on it.
However, where the hermeneutic of unity is allowed to do its work, we can
come to see that the state of separation is at the same time a state of symbiosis
—a pathological symbiosis that needs the other in order to react against it. We
can truly confess to our fellow Christians in another church that we engage
with: we are what we are because you are what you are. We would not be what
we are if it were not for you; you would not be what you are if it were not for
us. We have made you what you are and you have made us what we are —at
least in part. Because we have each invested something deep and difficult
about ourselves in the other, we cannot see each other for what we are. Under-
standing is inhibited. When once we become aware of that strange mutual
dependence and mutual investment, an enlightenment dawns in which truthful
interpretation can now take place. We can bring to light the unity that exists







En un sentit que pot semblar trivial, comparat amb els enormes conflictes ideolò-
gics del segle passat, les esglésies que conviuen en un mateix espai i competeixen per
l'hegemonia, també es defineixen a sí mateixes per la seva contraposició d’una amb
l’altra (per exemple, els catòlics romans i els protestants a Irlanda del Nord fins ben
recentment). Però s'aplica de manera general, no només en situacions extremes, en
les que saps qui ets quan ets conscient que no ets l'altre. Cada vegada que perpetuem
l'estereotip i estigmatitzem allò que s'ha comprovat tan destructiu en la història del cris-
tianisme, generem separació i divisió. No farem hermenèutica en aquesta ponència.
Tanmateix, on aparegui l'hermenèutica de la unitat en aquest treball, podrem compro-
var que l'estat de separació és al mateix temps un estat de simbiosis —una simbiosis
patològica que necessita l'altre per tal de poder reaccionar-hi en contra. Podem confes-
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sar veritablement als nostres seguidors cristians que ens mantenim amb ells: nosaltres
som qui som perquè vosaltres sou els que sou. No seríem qui som, sinó fos per vosal-
tres; vosaltres no serieu qui sou, sinó fos per nosaltres. En el moment en què ens
assabentem d'aquesta estranya i mútua dependència que es miralleja l’una amb l’altra,
ens adonarem que una interpretació honesta pot tenir cabuda. Podem treure a la llum
la unitat que existeix en el fons i començar a construir d'una manera visible en aquesta
direcció.
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